Secure The Plant You Cannot Stop And The Product You Cannot Recall

A controller commissioned before its vendor had a patching process, and a fleet of devices already in customers' hands: neither tolerates the security model built for laptops. IrisInfosec secures both. ICS and SCADA assessment to IEC 62443, industrial protocol and firmware analysis, and Cyber Resilience Act readiness for products with digital elements.

62443

Assessed and designed to IEC 62443 zones, conduits and security levels.

24h / 72h

CRA early warning and full notification clock for an exploited vulnerability.

4

Industrial protocols in standard scope: Modbus, MQTT, OPC UA and DNP3.

Passive first

Assessment methods chosen so production keeps running.

What this covers

Two estates, one discipline

Operational technology and connected products are usually treated as separate problems, and they are usually secured by the same small group of people. A plant operator has to keep a process running while satisfying NIS2. A manufacturer has to keep shipping while satisfying the Cyber Resilience Act. Both are working with equipment that cannot be rebuilt and software that cannot be patched on a normal cycle.

We work on both sides of that line, which is why the advice holds. The segmentation design we build for an operator is informed by how the devices in it actually behave, and the product security file we build for a manufacturer is informed by what happens to that product once it is installed in someone's plant.

In one line

IoT and OT security is the discipline of securing industrial control systems and connected products on their own terms: assessment methods that respect safety and uptime, architecture that assumes the device cannot defend itself, and the evidence that NIS2, IEC 62443 and the Cyber Resilience Act each ask for.

What we assess

The estate as it actually exists, not as the diagram shows it

ICS and SCADA environments

PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, historians and engineering workstations assessed against IEC 62443, including the Purdue level boundaries that have quietly eroded.

Industrial protocols

Modbus, MQTT, OPC UA, DNP3, PROFINET, EtherNet/IP and BACnet examined for authentication, integrity and exposure, mostly through passive capture.

Device firmware and hardware

Firmware extraction and binary analysis, hardcoded secrets, debug and JTAG interfaces, secure boot and update signing on the devices you build or buy.

Connected product fleets

Provisioning, identity, cloud back end and over-the-air update path assessed as one system, because that is how an attacker reaches the fleet.

Remote access and maintenance

Vendor and integrator access reviewed and redesigned around brokered, monitored, time-bound sessions instead of standing VPN accounts.

OT monitoring and detection

Passive network monitoring, asset visibility and detection content tuned for industrial traffic, wired into your SOC rather than a separate console.

Two duties, two evidence trails

Operator or manufacturer, the obligation is not the same

Most confusion in this space comes from mixing the two. Here is the split we work to, and how a single organisation that does both is handled.

Operator Manufacturer
Your position You operate the environment You place the product on the market
Primary regime NIS2 Article 21, sector rules and national implementation EU Cyber Resilience Act, plus RED where radio equipment is in scope
Reference standard IEC 62443, particularly 62443-2-1 and 62443-3-3 EN 18031 series, ETSI EN 303 645 for consumer IoT, IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2 for components
Core question Can this process be disrupted, and can we prove we managed the risk Is this product secure by design, and can we report what gets exploited
What we build Zone and conduit model, segmentation, brokered access, OT monitoring Security requirements, threat model, technical file, SBOM and vulnerability handling
If you are both Common threat intelligence, one asset inventory and one reporting workflow, with the two evidence trails kept separate for audit

How we test without becoming the incident

Method chosen for the environment, not for the report

Active scanning has knocked over more industrial equipment than most attackers have. We plan around that.

The people who carry the consequence sign the plan. Process safety and operations approve the test plan alongside security, before anything active happens.

Depth without touching the fleet. Aggressive testing and reverse engineering happen on bench units and sample hardware, so they go as deep as they need to.

Stage What we do
Passive capture first Span or tap the traffic and build the asset picture without sending a single packet into the process network
Lab and replica testing Aggressive testing runs against a bench unit, a digital twin or a maintenance spare, not against the running line
Agreed abort criteria The window, the observer, the rollback and the conditions under which we stop, agreed in writing before anything active happens
Safety sign-off Process safety and operations sign the plan alongside security
Lab reverse engineering Hardware and firmware analysis on sample units and extracted images, never on a deployed fleet

How we work

From current state to controls you can run

A measured five-stage approach, scoped to the estate that actually exists.

01

Inventory

Build the real asset picture from passive capture, configuration review and interviews, including the equipment no one owns.

02

Zone And Model

Group assets into IEC 62443 zones and conduits, assign target security levels and threat model each boundary.

03

Assess Safely

Protocol, firmware and configuration testing using methods matched to what the environment can tolerate.

04

Engineer

Segmentation, brokered remote access, secure update paths and monitoring designed for equipment you cannot replace.

05

Evidence And Sustain

Technical file, reporting workflow and a review cadence that keeps the picture current as the estate changes.

What you receive

Records for the regulator, drawings for the engineer

OT asset inventory and network map

The estate as it is, including the assets that were not on the drawing.

Zone and conduit model

IEC 62443 zones with target security levels and the conduits between them.

Protocol and firmware findings

Reproducible technical findings with evidence, ranked by exploitability and process consequence.

Segmentation and remote access design

A staged design that reduces blast radius without interrupting production.

CRA technical file pack

Security requirements, SBOM, vulnerability handling policy and the reporting workflow.

OT monitoring and incident runbook

Detection content for industrial traffic and a response path that respects safety.

Find out where you stand before the clock starts

Ask For A CRA And IEC 62443 Readiness Read

Send us the product scope or the plant scope. We will map it to the duties that apply
and the gaps that matter, usually within 3 business days.

Questions, answered

IoT and OT Security FAQ's

Operational technology security protects the systems that run physical processes: control systems, industrial networks and the equipment they drive. The difference is priority order. IT security usually puts confidentiality first and can tolerate a restart. OT puts safety and availability first, runs equipment with a lifecycle measured in decades, and treats an unplanned stop as the incident. That changes the controls, the testing methods and the acceptable risk.

Not if it is planned properly. We start with passive capture, which sends nothing into the process network, and build the asset picture from observed traffic and configuration review. Anything active is agreed in writing first, with a window, an observer from operations, rollback steps and explicit abort criteria. Where a test cannot be run safely on the live estate, it runs on a bench unit or a replica.

IEC 62443 is the international standard family for industrial automation and control system security. It structures an estate into zones and conduits, assigns each a target security level and sets requirements for operators, integrators and component makers. NIS2 sets the legal duty to manage risk and report incidents but does not prescribe technology. IEC 62443 is the recognised way to demonstrate that duty has been met in an industrial environment.

The Cyber Resilience Act applies to products with digital elements placed on the EU market, which covers most connected hardware and a great deal of software. From 11 September 2026 manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents, with an early warning within 24 hours and a full notification within 72 hours. The wider obligations, including essential requirements, technical documentation and an SBOM, apply from 11 December 2027.

Evidence that the product was designed and built against the essential requirements, that a vulnerability handling process exists for the support period, and a software bill of materials covering at least the top-level dependencies in a commonly used machine-readable format. CycloneDX and SPDX are the formats teams use in practice. The obligation covers products already on the market, not only new launches.

Both. Firmware work includes extraction, binary and file system analysis, hardcoded credentials and keys, update and secure boot verification, and the exposed debug interfaces manufacturers forget to disable. Where the physical device matters we examine the interfaces on the board. Network work covers the protocols and the boundaries. Most useful findings sit where the two meet.

Both carry their own regimes on top of the general product duties. Automotive works to UNECE R155 and R156, which have applied to all new vehicles in the contracting parties since July 2024, with ISO/SAE 21434 as the engineering method behind the threat analysis. Medical devices work to the EU medical device rules and, for the US market, to section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which requires a postmarket vulnerability plan and an SBOM.

Yes, through our enterprise cyber defense pillar. The corporate side is where most industrial intrusions begin, so the two are usually scoped together: segmentation and brokered access at the boundary, identity and endpoint controls on the enterprise side, and one monitoring picture across both.

Related services

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