A controller commissioned before its vendor had a patching process, and a fleet of devices already in customers' hands: neither tolerates the security model built for laptops. IrisInfosec secures both. ICS and SCADA assessment to IEC 62443, industrial protocol and firmware analysis, and Cyber Resilience Act readiness for products with digital elements.
Operational technology and connected products are usually treated as separate problems, and they are usually secured by the same small group of people. A plant operator has to keep a process running while satisfying NIS2. A manufacturer has to keep shipping while satisfying the Cyber Resilience Act. Both are working with equipment that cannot be rebuilt and software that cannot be patched on a normal cycle.
We work on both sides of that line, which is why the advice holds. The segmentation design we build for an operator is informed by how the devices in it actually behave, and the product security file we build for a manufacturer is informed by what happens to that product once it is installed in someone's plant.
IoT and OT security is the discipline of securing industrial control systems and connected products on their own terms: assessment methods that respect safety and uptime, architecture that assumes the device cannot defend itself, and the evidence that NIS2, IEC 62443 and the Cyber Resilience Act each ask for.
What we assess
PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, historians and engineering workstations assessed against IEC 62443, including the Purdue level boundaries that have quietly eroded.
Modbus, MQTT, OPC UA, DNP3, PROFINET, EtherNet/IP and BACnet examined for authentication, integrity and exposure, mostly through passive capture.
Firmware extraction and binary analysis, hardcoded secrets, debug and JTAG interfaces, secure boot and update signing on the devices you build or buy.
Provisioning, identity, cloud back end and over-the-air update path assessed as one system, because that is how an attacker reaches the fleet.
Vendor and integrator access reviewed and redesigned around brokered, monitored, time-bound sessions instead of standing VPN accounts.
Passive network monitoring, asset visibility and detection content tuned for industrial traffic, wired into your SOC rather than a separate console.
Two duties, two evidence trails
Most confusion in this space comes from mixing the two. Here is the split we work to, and how a single organisation that does both is handled.
| Operator | Manufacturer | |
|---|---|---|
| Your position | You operate the environment | You place the product on the market |
| Primary regime | NIS2 Article 21, sector rules and national implementation | EU Cyber Resilience Act, plus RED where radio equipment is in scope |
| Reference standard | IEC 62443, particularly 62443-2-1 and 62443-3-3 | EN 18031 series, ETSI EN 303 645 for consumer IoT, IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2 for components |
| Core question | Can this process be disrupted, and can we prove we managed the risk | Is this product secure by design, and can we report what gets exploited |
| What we build | Zone and conduit model, segmentation, brokered access, OT monitoring | Security requirements, threat model, technical file, SBOM and vulnerability handling |
| If you are both | Common threat intelligence, one asset inventory and one reporting workflow, with the two evidence trails kept separate for audit | |
How we test without becoming the incident
Active scanning has knocked over more industrial equipment than most attackers have. We plan around that.
The people who carry the consequence sign the plan. Process safety and operations approve the test plan alongside security, before anything active happens.
Depth without touching the fleet. Aggressive testing and reverse engineering happen on bench units and sample hardware, so they go as deep as they need to.
| Stage | What we do | |
|---|---|---|
| Passive capture first | Span or tap the traffic and build the asset picture without sending a single packet into the process network | |
| Lab and replica testing | Aggressive testing runs against a bench unit, a digital twin or a maintenance spare, not against the running line | |
| Agreed abort criteria | The window, the observer, the rollback and the conditions under which we stop, agreed in writing before anything active happens | |
| Safety sign-off | Process safety and operations sign the plan alongside security | |
| Lab reverse engineering | Hardware and firmware analysis on sample units and extracted images, never on a deployed fleet |
How we work
A measured five-stage approach, scoped to the estate that actually exists.
Build the real asset picture from passive capture, configuration review and interviews, including the equipment no one owns.
Group assets into IEC 62443 zones and conduits, assign target security levels and threat model each boundary.
Protocol, firmware and configuration testing using methods matched to what the environment can tolerate.
Segmentation, brokered remote access, secure update paths and monitoring designed for equipment you cannot replace.
Technical file, reporting workflow and a review cadence that keeps the picture current as the estate changes.
What you receive
The estate as it is, including the assets that were not on the drawing.
IEC 62443 zones with target security levels and the conduits between them.
Reproducible technical findings with evidence, ranked by exploitability and process consequence.
A staged design that reduces blast radius without interrupting production.
Security requirements, SBOM, vulnerability handling policy and the reporting workflow.
Detection content for industrial traffic and a response path that respects safety.
Find out where you stand before the clock starts
Send us the product scope or the plant scope. We will map it to the duties that apply
and the gaps that matter, usually within 3 business days.
Questions, answered
Related services